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Articles
THE WTO AGREEMENT ON GOVERNMENT 
PROCUREMENT AND THE UNCITRAL MODEL 
PROCUREMENT LAW: 
A VIEW FROM OUTSIDE THE REGION
John Linarelli∗
ABSTRACT
Two  of  the  most  significant  efforts  to  bring  municipal  
procurement  institutions  up  to  international  standards  are  the  
WTO  Agreement  on  Government  Procurement  (GPA)  and  the  
UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction 
and Services. Though the Model Law has had limited adoptions, it  
enjoys  global influence as  a  source of  norms and practices  for  
good public procurement. The GPA, also reflective of international 
standards, seems to be on the rise, as more WTO members elect to  
become GPA contracting parties.  This article explores two aspects  
of these instruments. First, the article explores how the Model Law  
promotes efficient public procurement. It explains how the ongoing  
revisions of the Model Law, in particular in the area of electronic  
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reverse auctions, continues to promote efficiency in procurement  
systems.  Second,  the  article  explores  how  the  GPA  promotes 
efficiency in its non-market access provisions, but that its market  
access  provisions  permit  governments  to  take  the  fairness  of  
procurement  policies  into  account,  through  socio-economic  
programs. Only efficiency is a value at the transnational level, and 
fairness is a concern only of municipal governments at this time.  
The  GPA  thus  imperfectly  facilitates  a  mix  of  efficiency  and  
fairness  policies  in  the  procurement  systems  of  the  GPA 
contracting parties. Only GPA contracting parties with significant 
market  leverage,  who  can  open  up  substantial  procurement  
markets  while  still  maintaining  protected  socio-economic  
procurements, can effectively promote both fairness and efficiency 
in their procurement systems. Of course, what one country might  
characterize  as  fairness,  another  might  characterize  as  rent-
seeking  protection,  and  it  is  well  accepted  that  while  trade  
restrictive  policies  often  seem  laudable  in  theory,  they  can  be 
difficult to implement and harmful in practice.
KEYWORDS: public procurement; world trade; law and development; relation 
of economics to social values; new institutional economics; distributive justice
I. INTRODUCTION
Public procurement law and policy exists in a nether world in terms of 
inquiry  about  its  relationship  to  international  trade  and  the  economic 
growth  of  states.  Much  of  the  activity  in  procurement  law  reform  in 
countries working to improve their procurement systems is undertaken at 
the  level  of  the  practitioner’s  art.  The  focus  is  on  action  and  on  the 
immediate  practicalities  of  procurement  reform.  It  is  reminiscent  of  the 
substantial legislative activity in the 1980s and 1990s to combat “fraud, 
waste and abuse” in the United States federal procurement system. How 
could any U.S. congressman be against fighting fraud, waste and abuse? 
The result was a “ratchet effect”1 in production of ever more procurement 
1 See generally William E. Kovacic,  Regulatory Controls as Barriers to Entry in Government 
Procurement, 25 POL’Y SCI. 29 (1992).
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laws,  so  that  what  we  have  in  the  United  States  is  an  overregulated 
procurement  system  that  is  still  inefficient,  and  regrettably,  prone  to 
corruption.2 Many of us who work and think about procurement law and 
policy learned our craft while doing it, either in actual purchasing or in law 
practice  representing  government  or  contractor  clients.  As  a  body  of 
experts  we  thus  focus  on  implementation  of  procurement  reform  and 
liberalization. The aim of this paper is to reflect on the strategic aspects of 
public procurement  law reform and liberalization of  public  procurement 
markets at the WTO level. I examine some justifications for procurement 
reform  and  liberalization  to  support  a  consensus  on  why  reform  is 
important and what it is supposed to do. Public procurement is a means to 
an end. Even when public procurement reform is seen as part of the project 
to  promote  good  governance,  the  higher  goal  of  good  governance  is  a 
means to  an end as well.3 The end is  about  improving the  lives  of  the 
citizens  of  countries,  citizens  whose  scarce  funds  are  used  to  finance 
procurement. It seems uncontroversial to say that public procurement law 
and institutions must be efficient, but they must be fair as well, and when 
fairness  and  efficiency  conflict,  we  must  recognize  that  fairness  might 
come at a social cost. The analysis set forth here requires us to momentarily 
separate action from inquiry, and to think about procurement reform and 
liberalization principally from the standpoint of inquiry.
What I am getting at here is a view from outside the region. In the 
1960s and 1970s, American lawyers, with the financial assistance of the 
U.S.  government  and  multilateral  institutions,  embarked  on  ambitious 
programs to  assist  developing  countries  with  legal  reforms.  One  of  the 
leaders of that movement, Stanford Professor John Henry Merryman, wrote 
an  influential  paper,  published  in  1977,  arguing  that  lawyers  spent  too 
much  effort  doing  law  reform projects  and  insufficient  effort  inquiring 
about the nature and activity of law in developing countries.  Merryman 
explained:
These characteristics: unfamiliarity with the target culture and 
society  (including  its  legal  system),  innocence  of  theory, 
artificially privileged access to power, and relative immunity to 
consequences, have been typical of many law and development 
proposals and programs for the third world.  Put another way, 
we  were  probably  incompetent  to  propose  or  execute  third 
world law and development action, we were encouraged (by our 
own self-image,  by the foreign assistance psychology and by 
2 Steven L. Schooner,  A Conversation about Malversation  The Post-Millennial U.S. Experience  
Combating Corruption in Public Procurement (June 19, 2006) (unpublished draft, on file with the 
author).
3 See The  World  Bank,  Poverty  Matters, http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/gc/governance/ 
governance.htm (last visited July 5, 2006).
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third-world  conditions)  to  do  so,  and  we  did  not  suffer  the 
consequences  of  having  done  so. The  mainstream  law  and 
development  movement,  dominated  by  the  American  legal 
style, was bound to fail and has failed.4
By contemporary standards, Merryman’s language may seem off the 
mark.  We no longer speak of the third  world.  Moreover,  his  comments 
seem directed at poorer countries than are represented at this conference, 
given the rise of the Asian economies. Law and development may not be a 
proper subject for this conference. But an important lesson emanates from 
Merryman’s words, one which still holds true today. Merryman went on to 
say that his findings are not as depressing as they may seem, and that he 
recommend we examine, from the standpoint of inquiry, the legal traditions 
and social institutions of countries before embarking on reform.5 In sum, 
legal scholars should be cautious in recommending reform, and base such 
recommendations on good information and a  thorough understanding of 
context.
This  paper  proceeds  from  Merryman’s  findings.  “Law  and 
development” is no longer the right name for the field. It is too narrow and 
it  is  misleading.  The  contemporary  focus  is  on  the  effect  of  law  on 
economic  growth,  which  is  improved  terminology,  but  still  in  need  of 
improvement because it fails to focus on fairness and distributive justice 
concerns. The law and development movement of Merryman’s generation 
was too focused on sociological inquiry and on what should be a repudiated 
concept of modernization. Law and economics has replaced sociologically 
based  inquiry  as  the  dominant  school  of  thought,  but  not  without  the 
introduction of a new set of problems. Economic analysis of law permits us 
to  ignore  important  policy  questions  through  a  reductionist  move  of 
selecting  a  discipline  to  use  in  the  analysis  that  does  not  provide  the 
analytical tools to recognize and answer the questions. With economics as 
the dominant paradigm, the focus still is on important issues like, how to 
produce  an  adequate  institutional  infrastructure  to  facilitate  credit  and 
business financing, or how to improve courts and the machinery of justice, 
or on how to achieve recognition of the informal economy and improve the 
4 John Henrry Merryman,  Comparative Law and Social Change  On the Origins, Style, Decline 
and Revival of the Law and Development Movement,  25  AM. J. COMP. L. 457, 481 (1977);  see 
generally  Francis  G.  Snyder,  Book  Review  The  Failure  of  “Law  and  Development”  Legal  
Imperialism  American Lawyers and Foreign Aid in Latin America, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 373 (1982); 
Elliot Burg, Law and Development  A Review of the Literature and a Critique of “Scholars in Self-
Estrangement”, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 492 (1977); David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-
Estrangement  Some Reflections on the Crisis  in Law and Development Studies in the United  
States, 1974 WIS. L. REV. 1062 (1974).
5 Merryman, supra note 4, at 481.
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welfare  and  economic  security  of  participants  in  the  informal  sectors.6 
Given that all successful economies are mixed economies,7 however, one of 
the weaknesses in looking just to economics for answers is its lack of a 
theory  of  justice.  The  international  financial  institutions  have  begun  to 
respond  to  such  concerns.8 Economic  approaches,  which  rely  solely  on 
efficiency concepts, are helpful but incomplete. We also have to inquire 
about the fairness or justice of a particular law or policy. The fairness or 
justice  inquiry has to  be sensitive to the domestic  context  in which the 
policy will be implemented. Sometimes the result is friction between the 
international and domestic. This sort of friction is the locus of concern in 
many discussions about globalization.
What has all this got to do with public procurement? We want to have 
the complete set of tools to evaluate public procurement from a strategic 
policy  stance.  In  section  II  below,  I  explain  how  the  transparency 
characteristics of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, 
Construction and Services9 promote economic efficiency. In section III, I 
explain how the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA),10 
while promoting transparency and efficiency in much the same way as the 
UNCITRAL  Model  Law,  gives  GPA  contracting  parties  the  ability  to 
pursue social justice goals, but also how it limits the ability of contracting 
parties to pursue such goals. Section IV concludes the article.
II. EFFICIENCY ASPECTS OF THE UNCITRAL MODEL PROCUREMENT LAW
The economic efficiency of procurement rules is in part the result of 
the  way  they  produce  transparency  in  the  procurement  process. 
Transparency,  then,  relates  to  the  issue  of  governance.  Transparency  in 
public procurement provides governments, taxpayers, and other interested 
6 See, e.g., Nicholas Georgakopolous, Statistics of Legal Infrastructures  A Review of the Law and  
Finance Literature, 8 AM. J.L. & ECON. 62 (2006); Juan Carlos Butero, Rafael La Porta, Florencio 
López-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Alexander Volokh,  Judicial Reform, 18  WORLD BANK RES. 
OBSERVER 61 (2003); HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE 
WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000);  Richard E.  Messick,  Judicial  Reform and Economic  
Development  A Survey of the Issues, 14  WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 117 (1999);  Ross Levine, 
Law, Finance and Economic Growth, 8  J.  FINAN.  INTERMEDIATION 8  (1999);  Richard A.  Posner, 
Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development, 13 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 1 (1998); 
Heywood Fleisig,  Secured Transactions  The Power of Collateral, FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 44 
(June 1996).
7 Robert L. Kuttner, Development, Globalization, and Law, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 19 (2004).
8 See generally Kerry Rittich, The Future of Law and Development  Second Generation Reforms  
and the Incorporation of the Social, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 199 (2004).
9 The text  of the Model Procurement Law can be found at  http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/ 
uncitral_texts/procurement_infrastructure/1994Model.html (last visited July 5, 2006).
10  The text of the GPA can be found at, http://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/gproc_e/gp_gpa_e. 
htm (last visited July 5, 2006).
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parties with the ability to monitor expenditures of public funds in public 
procurement.  Transparency  also  provides  procurement  officials  with 
incentives to conduct procurements in best value terms. In this section, I 
show how the UNCITRAL Model Procurement Law promotes efficiency 
and begin  to  connect  the  efficiency  aspects  of  the  Model  Law to  good 
governance, but first a digression about the WTO.
In  the  1996  Singapore  Ministerial  Conference,  the  WTO  members 
established  a  Working  Group  on  Transparency  in  Government 
Procurement.11 The aim of the Working Group was to determine whether a 
new transparency framework agreement could take the place of the GPA. 
This  aim of  the  transparency  framework agreement  was  to  broaden the 
scope of participation in liberalization of procurement markets. Some trade 
negotiators  and  commentators  thought  that  such  an  agreement  could 
broaden participation beyond the then narrow “club” membership of the 
GPA, by permitting protectionist practices, so long as those practices were 
transparent.12 On August  1,  2004,  the  WTO General  Council  adopted a 
decision in which the transparency negotiations were discontinued.13 The 
transparency framework agreement is off the table for the Doha Ministerial 
Conference. The official WTO position is that the transparency agreement 
is on hold.14 Malaysia was one of the countries instrumental in bringing an 
end to the Working Group and eventual  negotiations.15 It  is  particularly 
difficult  for  Malaysia  to  join  any  procurement  liberalization  agreement 
unless that agreement permits the kind of substantial preference programs 
in public procurement that Malaysia has in place for its majority Malay or 
Bumiputera population.16
Though WTO work on the transparency framework agreement is on 
hold, there is reason for us to be sanguine about the prospects of moves 
toward  transparency  in  public  procurement,  coming  from  the  work  of 
UNCITRAL  on  the  Model  Procurement  Law.  The  on-hold  WTO 
transparency framework agreement relates to a larger point about public 
procurement,  and that  is  that  nearly  all  of  its  rules  are  at  least  in  part 
11 World  Trade  Organization,  Singapore  Ministerial  Declaration,  WT/MIN(96)/DEC (Dec.  13, 
1996), 36 I.L.M. 218 (1997).
12 John Linarelli,  The WTO Transparency Agenda  Law, Economics and International Relations  
Theory, in PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: THE CONTINUING REVOLUTION 235, 241-42 (Sue Arrowsmith & Martin 
Trybus eds., Kluwer Law International 2003).
13 Robert  D.  Anderson,  Developments  on  Public  Procurement  in  the  WTO (June  19,  2006) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
14 Id.
15 See generally Christopher McCrudden & Stuart G. Gross, WTO Government Procurement Rules  
and the Local Dynamics of Procurement Policies  A Malaysian Case Study, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 151 
(2006).
16 Id. at 153.
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justifiable on the basis of transparency, regardless of the legal regime in 
which the rules happen to be located.
In  this  section,  I  provide  a  way of  thinking about  the  transparency 
aspects  of  procurement,  mainly  using  the  tools  of  new  institutional 
economics.  Public  procurement  law is  rich  in  legal  rules  susceptible  to 
economic analysis.17 The potentially richest source of economic methods 
available for analyzing the structure of legal rules on public procurement is 
what  economists  variously  describe  as  contract  theory,  principal  agent 
theory,  or the  economics of information.  The economic toolkit  provides 
what Laffont and Tirole call “contractible variables” − variables facilitating 
the  ability  of  interested  parties  to  monitor  procurement  practices  and 
market access.18 Transparency gives interested parties the ability to know 
about  poor  practices  in  public  procurement,  as  well  as  trade  barriers  in 
public  procurement  markets.  Transparency  relates  to  both  good 
procurement  practices  –  in  achieving value  for  money –  and to  market 
access  –  to  understanding  how  open  or  closed  procurement  markets 
actually are.  
The  standard  explanation  goes  as  follows.19 A  basic  question 
procurement officials face during the planning stages of a procurement is 
what method of procurement should be adopted. Related to this question is 
what should be the evaluation criteria by which offers should be judged. In 
the  legal  systems  of  many  countries,  and  in  the  UNCITRAL  Model 
Procurement Law, a range of options exist to deal with these two issues. 
These options are usually constrained by certain conditions that must be 
met in order to justify reliance on a particular method of procurement or 
method of evaluation. As for methods of procurement,  governments can 
use  a  very  formal  approach,  such  as  sealed  bidding,  a  very  informal 
approach,  such  as  unstructured  negotiations  with  few  rules  to  bind 
procurement officials, or an intermediate approach, such as a request for 
proposals method of procurement, which permits negotiations but usually 
within a highly structured and legalistic format.  If sealed bidding is used, 
firms submit sealed bids, the government opens the bids for public view on 
a predetermined and published date and time, and the government makes 
award to the qualified bidder who submits  the lowest  price  or cost  and 
whose bid does not materially deviate from the government's solicitation of 
17 See generally Daniel R Fischel & Alan O Sykes, Governmental Liability for Breach of Contract, 
1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 343 (1999).
18 See generally JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, A THEORY OF INCENTIVES IN PROCUREMENT AND 
REGULATION (1993).
19 The above discussion is based on Linarelli,  The WTO Transparency Agenda, supra note 12, at 
256-65. For detailed discussion of the procurement principles, see generally SUE ARROWSMITH, JOHN 
LINARELLI &  DON WALLACE,  JR.,  REGULATING PUBLIC PROCUREMENT:  NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES (Kluwer Law International 2000).
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bids.20 In some jurisdictions, negotiations between government and bidders 
are  banned  in  the  sealed  bid  procedure,  which  usually  means  that  the 
government cannot go to the lowest bidder and ask for a lower price.21 To 
be  contrasted  with  sealed  bidding  is  a  request  for  proposals  method of 
procurement, where no bid opening occurs, but instead a closing date for 
submission of confidential proposals, which are then evaluated in secret by 
the  government,  although  they  are  still  required  to  be  evaluated  in 
accordance  with  evaluation criteria  published in  a  request  for  proposals 
issued by the procuring entity.  In a request for proposals procedure, the 
government may negotiate with proposing firms, and will typically apply 
significant  discretion  in  evaluating  technical  merit  and  in  trading  off 
technical merit against cost in determining which proposing firm is offering 
“best value.” We can contrast the sealed bidding and request for proposals 
methods of procurement with a wholly unstructured negotiated approach 
mirroring what might happen in some private sector contexts, in which the 
purchasing  agent  has  maximum discretion,  and  in  which  there  are  few 
constraints on the structure of the offer and acceptance process leading to 
contract award.
An important question for governments, taxpayers or other interested 
parties  in  a  procurement  context  –  what  in  economics  are  called 
“principals”  –  is  whether  procurement  officials  –  the  “agents”  –  have 
conducted procurements efficiently.22 This is a difficult question to answer 
because the  principals  have less  information than the  agents  about  how 
procurements are actually conducted. Principals want to monitor agents to 
determine whether the agents are making efficient procurement awards, but 
they  lack  adequate  information  to  determine  whether  procurements  are 
actually  conducted  efficiently.  Governments  have  developed  proxy 
variables to assess efficiency, much like variables that were developed by 
the insurance industry to evaluate risk. It is costly for insurance companies 
to determine whether an insured is actually careful,  so they do not base 
insurance  terms  on  the  actual  care  exercised  by  the  insured.  Rather, 
insurance companies use proxies that focus on results and statistics, such as 
numbers of accidents or claims, smoker versus non-smoker, young male 
versus  other  drivers,  and  other  such  information  which  can  facilitate 
20 In  some  jurisdictions,  sealed  bidding  can  only  be  used  along  with  an  evaluation  criterion 
requiring award on the basis of lowest price or cost. ARROWSMITH, LINARELLI & WALLACE, supra note 
19, at 674-79.
21 Id. at 488-503.
22 There can be a number of principals in the public procurement context. The principal can be 
taxpayers or ministers.  In procurements financed by a development bank such as the World Bank, 
the  principals  can  be  the  bank  shareholders,  the  bank's  directors,  the  bank  itself  or  even  the 
taxpayers in the shareholder countries.
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separating equilibria in the insurance market.23 Similar conditions hold in 
public procurement. It is costly for principals in the procurement context to 
determine whether procurement agents are actually efficient, so they do not 
actually evaluate efficiency in procurement. They instead use proxies. For 
example, sealed bidding is easier to monitor than the request for proposals 
or negotiated methods of procurement. In a sealed bid context, the question 
whether  a  procurement  is  conducted  efficiently  is  answered  simply  by 
asking whether the agent has followed the mandatory rules set out in the 
law. If she has, then the procurement is efficient. This analysis seems to 
explain a  number of  legal  rules  used in  public  procurement  systems.  It 
explains why the World Bank and the regional development banks maintain 
a  strong  preference  for  sealed  bidding  and  ban  negotiations  in  bank-
financed procurement. The development banks do not have the resources to 
conduct comprehensive audits,  evaluations or investigations of the many 
procurements they finance, so they accept that if the sealed bid procedure is 
used  properly,  then  by definition,  bank funds  are  being  spent  properly. 
What I have explained thus far, I have named the “information rationale” 
for transparency in public procurement.24
In  addition  to  providing  for  less  costly  monitoring  of  procurement 
agents,  formal methods of procurement,  such as sealed bidding,  provide 
procurement agents, who, unlike their private sector counterparts, are not 
constrained (or are constrained less) by market forces, with less discretion. 
The economist Armen Alchian has explained this “incentive rationale” for 
procurement rules.25 Alchian's incentive rationale is the traditional rationale 
for procurement law. The incentive rationale focuses on the need for tried 
and tested procurement methods in lieu of reliance on procurement officials 
making their own decisions. The incentive rationale is the weaker rationale 
because  it  fails  to  account  for  the  fact  that  in  the  right  circumstances, 
government officials have reputational, career and programmatic incentives 
to  be  efficient.  Both  the  incentive  rationale  and  the  above  information 
rationale,  and particularly the informational  rationale, support  formalism 
and legalism in public procurement, when it is necessary to preclude or at 
least mitigate moral hazard in procurement. Moral hazard is the problem of 
unobservable  or  hidden  action  that  may  occur  during  the  procurement 
process,  when  the  behavior  of  an  agent  conducting  the  procurement  is 
insufficiently observable.
A  significant  policy  base  for  the  rules  in  the  UNCITRAL  Model 
Procurement Law is the promotion of transparency in public procurement. 
23 See, e.g., Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q.J. ECON. 541 (1979).
24 Linarelli, supra note 12, at 258-59.
25 Armen Alchian,  Electrical Equipment Collusion  Why and How,  in ECONOMIC FORCES AT WORK 
259-69 (Armen Alchian ed., 1977).
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The  Model  Law  is  loaded  with  procedures  to  facilitate  monitoring  of 
government officials. If we examine UNCITRAL’s work in drafting and 
revising  the  Model  Law,  we  see  that  the  information  and  incentive 
rationales for transparency in procurement regimes are at work. Let us take 
a  look  at  the  latest  round  of  discussions  of  the  working  group,  which 
occurred in at the United Nations in New York on April 24-28, 2006. One 
of  the  more  substantive  areas  of  discussion  in  that  session  was  on  the 
inclusion of provisions in the Model Law to deal with electronic reverse 
auctions  or  ERAs  for  short.  The  Note  by  the  Secretariat,  upon  which 
discussions were based, explained, among other things that “the main issue 
for consideration is whether the ERA should include non-price criteria that 
are qualitative and not quantifiable.”26 The Secretariat explained that two 
models existed for electronic reverse auctions. In the first model, labeled 
Model 1, “all aspects of the bids that are to be evaluated in selecting the 
winning supplier are to be submitted through the auction. These criteria are 
the price alone, or the price and price-equivalents that can be expressed as a 
percentage of price or in figures.”27 In the second model, labeled Model 2, 
there is a
pre-auction assessment of all elements of the initial bid or of 
those elements  not  to  be  submitted  to  the  auction,  following 
which suppliers are ranked, and their rankings communicated to 
them. All evaluation criteria are then factored in a mathematical 
formula,  which  would  then  re-rank  the  bidders  on  the 
submission of each bid during the auction itself.28
So, Model 1 resembles the typical sealed bid procedure, in which only 
price and price-related factors are evaluated, and what is evaluated are the 
“bids” submitted through the electronic auctioning process. Model 2, on the 
other hand, involves “more complex procedures that allow criteria other 
than price to be subject to auction,” in which “a formula is to be used to 
quantify the non-price or non-price-equivalent elements to be presented.”29 
Though the Secretariat found it “implicit in the use of a formula that the 
non-price  or  price-equivalent  elements  are  expressed  as  a  figure, 
percentage,  or  otherwise  numerically”  the  Secretariat  suggested  that  the 
Working Group “consider whether it is realistic to make an assumption that 
26 Note by the Secretariat, Possible Revisions to the UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of 
Goods, Construction and Services – Drafting Materials for the Use of Electronic Reverse Auctions 
in Public Procurement and Addressing Abnormally Low Tenders, A/CN.9/WG.I/WP.43 (Feb. 15, 
2006). This and other UNCITRAL documents can be found at, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/ 
uncitral_texts/procurement_infrastructure/1994Model.html (last visited July 7, 2006).
27 Id. ¶ 28.
28 Id. ¶ 29.
29 Id. ¶ 31.
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non-price or non-price equivalent criteria can be so expressed in a clear and 
transparent manner.”30 The Model 2 approach is one adopted by the new 
European Union Directives. As the UN Secretariat has explained:
The new European Union Directives make provision for such 
non-price criteria to be subject to auction, but the Secretariat has 
been  able  to  locate  very  limited  examples  of  such  auctions 
conducted in practice so as to examine their effectiveness. In 
those encountered, non-quantifiable criteria were assessed using 
a  points  system.  For  example,  the  technical  and  commercial 
aspects of the tender in one case were assessed out of a score of 
6000, and each such point was converted using an “exchange 
rate”  of  2500  to  equate  price  reductions  with  the  additional 
value provided by the non-price assessment  points  (the  latter 
included such matters as management of subcontractor and the 
ability to deal with unusual incidental aspects of the contract, 
such as archaeological constraints). In another case, the value of 
risk transferred back to the procuring entity from minor tender 
noncompliances  and caveats  was  weighted in  cash terms (so 
doing is relatively straightforward if the risk can be insured, but 
in other cases may be difficult).31
Though the second, more complex and less transparent approach is the 
subject  of  the  new  European  Union  Directives  and  hence  may  be  the 
subject  of  European  practice  now  and  in  the  future,  a  number  of  the 
delegates  seemed  uncomfortable  with  the  level  of  discretion  Model  2 
affords to procurement officials. The result of the discussions to-date is a 
more conservative, less discretionary and more transparent approach. The 
Secretariat reported the sentiments of the delegates as follows:
It was pointed out that in drafting any provisions on electronic 
reverse  auctions  (ERAs)  in  the  Model  Law  and  the  Guide, 
conditions  in  and  interests  of  countries  that  would  primarily 
benefit  from the Model Law should be kept in  mind.  It  was 
pointed out that the Model Law had promoted so far traditional 
open  tendering  as  a  “gold  standard”,  whose  fundamental 
principles  included  prohibition  of  negotiations  and  a  single 
opportunity for a supplier to submit its best tender, which were 
contradicted by the inherent features of ERAs. Acknowledging 
and regulating ERAs in the Model Law could mean deviation 
30 Id.
31 Id. ¶ 32.
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from  these  fundamental  principles  and  dilution  of  the  “gold 
standard” of open tendering.32 
So, the option is to produce an electronic reverse auction procedure 
that is more transparent. A more transparent procedure appears to mean one 
that resembles sealed bidding more closely. The Working Group took into 
account, among other things, the position of the multilateral development 
banks on the question. The development banks tend to prefer more formal 
procedures in the nature of sealed bidding.33 The Secretariat expressed the 
collective view that the risks inherent in electronic reverse auctions should 
be  mitigated  through regulation.34 So,  the  Working Group considered  a 
number of procedural safeguards designed to maximize transparency in the 
electronic  reverse  auction  process.  “Anonymity  of  bidders  and  clear 
specifications established and made known to suppliers  at  the outset  of 
procurement  were  named  as  such  important  considerations.”35 As  well, 
“[e]xperience with ERAs in at least one jurisdiction, it was said, indicated 
that they might be a costly tool for procurement of demands for only one 
procuring  entity  as  third-party  contractors  were  hired.  Therefore, 
consolidated  purchases  were  encouraged.”36 Price  is  to  be  the  only 
evaluation criteria to be used, making the electronic reverse auction very 
much like a sealed bid procedure:
The initial preference was that the provisions should be drafted 
in such a way as to allow the price to be the only award criteria 
when ERAs were used. Allowing criteria other than price would 
open the possibilities of abuse as a subjective element could be 
introduced  into  the  process  when  trying  to  quantify  these 
criteria.37
In  addition,  the  delegates  expressed  the  view “that  establishing  the 
lowest  price  below  which  tender  would  not  be  accepted  could  be  an 
important  safeguard  for  a  proper  management  of  ERAs  and  against 
abnormally low tenders.”38
32 Report of Working Group I (Procurement) on the Work of its Ninth Session, ¶ 87, A/CN.9/595 
(May 8, 2006).
33 Id. ¶ 88.
34 Id.
35 Id. ¶ 89.
36 Id. ¶ 90.
37 Id. ¶ 91.
38 Id.
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Some  delegates  were  of  the  view  that  only  “standard  goods  and 
commodities” should be the subject of electronic reverse auctions.39 The 
Secretariat has explained the various views as follows:
The point was made that even standard services (for example, 
cleaning services) could have qualitative elements and therefore 
procurement through ERAs could compromise quality. On the 
other hand, it was stated that it would not be desirable to limit 
ERAs to any particular type of procurement as at this stage it 
would be  difficult  to  predict  how the  tool  would evolve.  As 
experience in some countries suggested, services were capable 
of being procured through ERAs even when quality mattered 
with  a  two  phase  approach,  the  first  phase  involving  the 
assessment of quality aspects.40
Throughout  the  discussion,  the  countervailing  arguments  for  and 
against Models 1 and 2 procedures were discussed. Some delegates were 
not entirely convinced that transparency required only a Model 1 approach. 
As the Secretariat has explained, “[a] number of objections were raised to 
providing  exclusively  for  Model  1  ERAs  as  they  presupposed  a  fully 
automated process, which especially at a transitional stage in development, 
could not be achieved without the risk of excluding a substantial number of 
suppliers.”41
The  delegates  agreed  that  electronic  reverse  auctions  should  be  a 
“stand-alone procurement  method,  to  avoid prejudicing their  evolution,” 
but  also acknowledged that  they  could be  an  “optional  phase” in  some 
procurement methods.42 The current  proposed text  for  a new method of 
procurement known as electronic reverse auctions, seen as a “compromise 
solution,  drafted  in  a  sufficiently  broad  and  flexible  manner  to  allow 
evolution of ERAs within a number of parameters,”43 is the following:
Article  [36  bis].  Conditions  for  use  of  electronic  reverse 
auctions
A procuring entity may engage in procurement by means of an 
electronic reverse auction in accordance with article [s 47 bis 
and ter] in the following circumstances:
(a)  Where it  is  feasible  for  the  procuring entity  to  formulate 
detailed and precise specifications for the goods, construction 
and services; 
39 Id. ¶ 92.
40 Id.
41 Id. ¶ 93.
42 Id. ¶ 94.
43 Id. ¶ 96.
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(b)  Where  there  is  a  competitive  market  of  suppliers  or 
contractors that are anticipated to be qualified to participate in 
the electronic reverse auction such that effective competition is 
ensured;
(c)  Where  it  concerns  (i)  commonly  used  goods,  the 
characteristics of which are generally available on the market; 
or  (ii)  commonly  used  services  or  constructions,  the 
characteristics of which are generally available on the market 
and provided that the services or constructions are of a simple 
nature; and
(d) the price is the only criterion to be used in determining the 
successful bid; or 
(e) [option for the legislator:] the price and other criteria that 
can be expressed in figures or transformed into monetary units 
and  can  be  evaluated  automatically  are  to  be  used  in 
determining the successful bid.44
It is clear from this tentative provision and its discussion, that the new 
procedure  promotes  the  information and incentive  rationales  that  justify 
transparency in public procurement.
There  were  some  dissenting  views  in  the  UNCITRAL  session, 
preferring more flexibility in the new procedure. “An observation was that 
the proposed text favoured price considerations at the expense of quality 
and that  the  approach should be reconsidered.”45 The response was that 
“that situation was inherent in ERAs and thus in procurement where quality 
was  more  important  than or  equal  to  price,  other  procurement  methods 
might be more suitable.”46 One possible solution to the problem of ensuring 
that electronic reverse auctions be as transparent as practicable is to explain 
their use and their risks in the Guide to Enactment.47
The point I am trying to make in this discussion is that the UNCITRAL 
Model Procurement  Law takes a  conservative approach to  procurement, 
focusing  on  the  traditional  procurement  disciplines,  which  promote 
transparency  and  hence  economic  efficiency.  Given  that  the  intended 
constituency  of  the  Model  Procurement  Law  is  countries  in  need  of 
procurement law reform – principally developing countries and countries in 
transition  from  socialism  –  the  conservative  approach  is  appropriate 
because what needs to be developed in the procurement systems of these 
countries is widely held competencies – good procurement practices, based 
44 Id. ¶ 95.
45 Id. ¶ 97.
46 Id.
47 Id. ¶¶ 99-104.
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on time-tested procurement disciplines. Ultimately, to take the reasoning to 
its  logical  conclusion,  it  is  not  just  about  drafting  and  promulgating 
legislation  on  the  books,  but  about  developing  capacities  to  conduct 
procurement based on the disciplines found in the Model Law.
The formalism and legalism prevalent in the UNCITRAL Model Law 
is not without tradeoffs.48 There may be cases in which legal rules imposing 
formality in public procurement, and the resulting loss of discretion in the 
hands of procurement officials, may mean that a procuring entity is forced 
to achieve transparency at the expense of good business practice. Anyone 
experienced  in  procurement  practices  can  cite  the  examples.  But  as  a 
general matter, all things being equal, we want procurements to be more 
rather than less transparent.
Two models of procurement governance have emerged from the efforts 
of  the  last  decade  or  so  to  develop  and  improve  public  procurement 
systems.  These models relate directly to the above institutional analysis. 
Some of these efforts come from the need to distinguish public from private 
contracting  in  countries  transitioning  to  market  oriented  economies.  In 
some  cases  their  purpose  is  to  bring  procurement  systems  up  to 
international standards in response to attention from the World Bank and 
other international institutions. In the past I have divided these models into 
two,  the  developed  country  model  and  the  developing  or  transitioning 
country model, though this terminology may not be sufficiently general.49 
The terminology can be generalized to classify according to the level of 
sophistication of the procurement regulatory regime in a country, regardless 
of the income level of the country. The two models can be described as a 
“mature” procurement systems model, which I designate as model 1, and 
an “emerging” procurement systems model, which I designate as model 2. 
In model 1 systems,  governments have a significant degree of power to 
provide incentives for contractor compliance with procurement rules and 
contract terms. In model 1 systems, a high degree of professionalization of 
the  procurement  workforce  exists,  and  adequate  remuneration  for 
procurement  officials  through  an  established  civil  service  system.  The 
professionalization of the workforce is due in substantial part to years of 
costly investment in the human capital of civil service employees. Model 1 
systems  include  substantial  criminal  and  quasi-criminal  investigative 
institutions complementing significant procurement regulatory institutions. 
In countries with model 1 systems, substantial levels of monitors exist in 
the form of internal enforcement bodies whose functions are to deter fraud, 
waste and abuse. In addition to such internal enforcement institutions, some 
countries  have  privatized  enforcement  in  bid  challenge  or  bid  protest 
48 The above discussion is based on Linarelli, supra note 12, at 259-60.
49 The above discussion is based on id. at 264-65.
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systems that permit interested parties (typically disappointed offerors) to 
protest  procurement  actions that  they claim violate  procurement  law. In 
model 1 systems, procurement by open procedures or by sealed bidding is 
not  the  norm.  Effective  enforcement  institutions  and  a  well-trained  and 
well-compensated bureaucracy make less transparency a worthwhile trade-
off for enhanced discretion and flexibility.
The  procurement  systems  in  the  countries  meeting  model  1 
characteristics contrast markedly with procurement systems meeting model 
2 characteristics. Many of the features of procurement law and practice in 
model 1 systems tend either to not exist in model 2 systems, or tend to exist 
at  only  the  early  stages.  A commonly  held  view is  that  countries  with 
model  2  systems  are  not  yet  in  a  position  to  use,  at  least  extensively, 
informal procurement procedures. The implementation of a model 1 system 
would  require  the  fundamental  reform  of  judiciaries,  legislatures  and 
bureaucracies, something that cannot be forthcoming immediately in some 
countries, especially in developing countries and countries with transition 
economies. Enforcement institutions do not exist or are deficient in model 2 
systems.  Model  2  systems  rely  relatively  more  on  the  transparency  of 
procurement procedures to facilitate monitoring of procuring entities and 
contractors. Open competitive bidding, which provides more transparency 
than  methods  of  procurement  based  on  requests  for  proposals  or 
negotiation, tends to be the norm. A commonly held view is that bidding 
promotes a number of procurement disciplines that are fundamental to good 
procurement  practice  and  that  should  be  mastered  before  taking  on 
procurement through requests for proposals or negotiation.
The above analysis is not intended to suggest that procurement officials 
in  countries  with mature  procurement  regulatory  systems are  noble  and 
public  interest  minded  and  that  their  counterparts  in  countries  with 
emerging procurement  regulatory systems are  venal  and corrupt.  As  we 
well know, corruption in the procurement systems of developed countries 
can be widespread.50 Moreover, it is not a matter of culture but of context 
and  incentives.  The  point  is  that  principal-agent  monitoring  relies  on 
established legal and bureaucratic institutions that do a good job at aligning 
the incentives of procurement agents with those of their principals.
III. TEMPERING EFFICIENCY WITH FAIRNESS: GPA MARKET ACCESS
In  an  article  I  wrote  in  2001,  I  called  the  GPA  a  “failure  of 
cooperation” because of its limited “club” membership.51 At the time, there 
50 Schooner, supra note 2.
51 Linarelli, supra note 12, at 235. The focus of my criticism was on the limited number of WTO 
members who are GPA contracting parties. An alternative measure suggested to me, the value of 
procurements liberalized, would have produced a more optimistic assessment of the GPA. Id. at 
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was some optimism about the development of the transparency framework 
agreement, though that project has since been discontinued.52  I would like 
to retract my “failure” conclusion. With the pressure of the United States 
and other WTO members, it seems the GPA is to have broader participation 
in the future. At the current time, nine WTO members are negotiating for 
accession to the GPA. They are: Albania, Bulgaria, Georgia, Jordan, the 
Kyrgyz  Republic,  Moldova,  Oman,  Panama,  and  Chinese  Taipei. 
Moreover, the Protocols of Accession of a further six WTO members say 
something about eventual accession to the GPA. These WTO members are: 
Armenia,  China,  Croatia,  the  Former  Yugoslav  Republic  of  Macedonia, 
Mongolia and Saudi Arabia. China recently confirmed that it will formally 
begin the accession process by submitting an accession offer under GPA 
Appendix I by the end of 2007.53
Some of these WTO members have relied on the UNCITRAL Model 
Law  to  reform  their  procurement  systems.54 Both  the  GPA  and  the 
UNCITRAL  Model  Law  promote  transparency.  The  transparency 
characteristics of the UNCITRAL Model Law promote trade liberalization 
because they facilitate monitoring of commitments of the GPA contracting 
parties by each other. The same principal-agent reasoning discussed above 
in the domestic context applies in the international context. To the extent 
that the GPA text contains similar principles – and it does – these principles 
facilitate monitoring by GPA contracting parties. The GPA implements the 
information  rationale  discussed  above.  The  GPA  sets  forth  detailed 
“positive”  rules  with  which  GPA  contracting  parties  are  required  to 
comply.55 The aim of the GPA is to harmonize domestic procurement rules, 
for public procurements to which the GPA applies. For procurements to 
which the GPA applies, GPA contracting parties are obligated to conform 
their domestic procurement rules to GPA requirements. Positive rules are to 
be distinguished from negative rules, which require countries to comply 
with  WTO  obligations,  but  leave  it  to  the  members  to  decide  how 
235 n.1.
52 See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
53 See Anderson, supra note 13.
54 The  following countries  have  adopted  legislation based on or  inspired  by the  UNCITRAL 
Model  Procurement  Law:  Albania,  Azerbaijan,  Croatia,  Estonia,  Gambia  (2001),  Kazakhstan, 
Kenya,  Kyrgyzstan,  Malawi  (2003),  Mauritius,  Mongolia,  Poland,  Republic  of  Moldova, 
Romania, Slovakia, Tanzania, Uganda, and Uzbekistan. UNCITRAL, Status of 1994 UNCITRAL 
Model  Law  on  Procurement  of  Goods,  Construction,  and  Services, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/ 
uncitral_texts/procurement_infrastructure/1994Model_status.html (last visited July 7, 2006).
55 Linarelli, supra  note 12, at 236-37; William A. Dymond & Michael  M. Hart,  Post  Modern 
Trade Policy  Reflections on the Challenges to Multilateral Trade Negotiations  after Seattle,  J. 
WORLD TRADE 21,  29  (2000);  Susan  Brown,  The  Developing  Countries  and  Transparency  in 
Government Procurement  Strategic Issues, paper prepared for UNCTAD (Aug. 11, 1999). 
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compliance will be achieved.56 In this sense, the GPA was ahead of its time. 
This sort of positive rule making did not occur in earnest in the multilateral 
trading system until the Uruguay Round; its most prominent example is the 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.57 The 
positive rules in the GPA text may form part of the reason why the GPA 
participation base has been so limited.
The text of the GPA itself – the part detailing requirements on how 
procurements  are  to  be  conducted  –  can  be  conceptualized  as  the  non-
market access provisions of the GPA.58 The market access provisions are 
the  all-important  annexes,  which the  GPA contracting parties  negotiate. 
While  the  non-market  access  provisions  could  be  said  to  promote 
transparency,  the  market  access  provisions  could  be  said  to  promote 
fairness. This may seem an odd conclusion, but here is the explanation.
The GPA market access provisions promote fairness to the extent that 
they give GPA contracting parties the ability to promote social justice and 
to intermediate the effects of globalization on public contracting markets, 
and to the extent that some level of protection forms part of a legitimate 
political consensus within the constitutional systems of GPA contracting 
parties  who  choose  to  follow  such  a  route.  For  example,  if  a  GPA 
contracting  party  maintains  a  policy  of  repair  to  remedy past  actual  or 
societal discrimination against certain groups, then it can withhold market 
access for some procurements designated for these groups, by not putting 
those  procurements  on  the  table  for  coverage by  the  GPA.  The United 
States  does  something  like  this  for  its  substantial  minority  and  small 
business  programs.59 Two  stories  have  been  told  about  so-called 
preferences  in  public  procurement.60 Both  stories  contain  a  number  of 
truths, though the stories themselves are oppositional to some extent, one 
describing a case of justice and the other a case of economic waste.
First,  I  provide  the  “good”  story  about  preferences.  Preferences 
promote social justice for disadvantaged groups. In some countries, they 
are intended to mitigate historic injustice, situations in which past policies 
made favored groups better off while making disfavored groups worse off. 
56 Linarelli, supra note 12, at 236-37, for a discussion of these issues.
57 See Frederick M. Abbott, TRIPS in Seattle  The Not-So-Surprising Failure and the Future of the  
TRIPS Agenda, 18 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 165, 166-67 (2000).
58 I am grateful to Robert Anderson for the market access and non-market access terminology.
59 The U.S. Supreme Court has imposed constitutional limitations on such “set asides.” See, e.g., 
Adarand Constructors,  Inc.  v.  Pena,  515 U.S.  200 (1995).  (The claim made by the petitioner, 
Adarand Constructors, Inc., which was not a certified small business under the Small Business 
Administration  program,  was  that  the  race-based  presumptions  used  in  subcontractors 
compensation clauses violate the Fifth Amendment.)
60 The typical preferences are for domestic contractors owned by certain disadvantaged groups, 
based on ethnicity  or  gender,  or  preferences  based on the domestic content  of  the  goods  and 
services provided by the contractor.
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This is the policy of repair approach mentioned above. Some scholars have 
named such an approach a trade stakeholder model.61 Such a model values 
broad participation by domestic constituencies in trade policy, at both the 
domestic and international levels. It is a model of deliberative democracy in 
which  social  justice  is  taken  into  account  as  a  variable  separate  from 
economic  efficiency.  In  the  good  story,  domestic  interest  groups  are 
important and are cast in a positive light. In the good story, interest groups 
in an open and transparent policymaking process promote diversity and the 
achievement of a broad overlapping consensus for public policy.
In the good story, as a matter of fairness, WTO members should retain 
the  ability  to  develop  programs  to  promote  participation  in  public 
procurement  by  members  of  all  segments  of  their  societies,  including 
programs  such  as  domestic  preferences,  set  asides,  and  procurement 
assistance for small and minority owned firms. Procurement is recognized 
as having important social policy implications. The good story accepts that 
the social consensuses reached within the domestic constitutional systems 
of the WTO members may produce states of affairs in which certain social 
justice goals trump trade goals.
In contrast to the tightness of the GPA non-market provisions around 
efficiency concepts, the market access provisions give the GPA contracting 
parties “outs” by converting the GPA into an umbrella arrangement for a 
series of negotiated arrangements liberalizing only those markets the WTO 
members could liberalize without running afoul of fairness principles. The 
non-market  access  provisions  are  subservient  to  the  market  access 
provisions; they apply only to procurements liberalized in the annexes.
So far, the good story has been cast in ideal terms. In reality, the GPA 
market  access  provisions  permit  the  implementation  of  social  justice 
policies imperfectly and incompletely. The GPA market access provisions 
allow GPA contracting parties to keep domestic preferences, provided they 
can liberalize sufficient numbers and values of other  procurements.  The 
United States does this; it opens up substantial procurement markets yet 
also keeps substantial procurement markets closed, in order to maintain its 
substantial preference programs. But here lies the potential problem. The 
extent of a GPA contracting party’s autonomy to pursue its own domestic 
social  justice  goals  is  a  function of  its  ability  to  offer  up  on  the  GPA 
negotiating table substantial other procurements unaffected by preference 
programs.  Thus,  in  the  GPA  context,  only  contracting  parties  with 
substantial import markets in public procurement have substantial policy 
autonomy. The bottom line is that a GPA contracting party needs market 
power to implement its own social justice goals in its own municipal legal 
61 See, e.g., G. Richard Schell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory  An Analysis of  
the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 910 (1995).
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system.  The  first  story  thus  has  a  mixed  ending,  though  this  is  not 
controversial,  since  theories  of  justice  do  not  easily  extend  beyond  the 
nation state even in ideal terms.62
The second or “bad” story about preferences is that they are wasteful 
and in some cases unjust.  Perhaps the bad story simply brings a measure of 
realism to the good story. The bad story is that some governments have 
used public procurement as an enclave in which politics predominates over 
market-based  considerations,  to  protect  favored  industries  or  even  to 
dispense patronage to political friends. In the worst case, corruption diverts 
scarce  public  resources  to  socially  wasteful  contracts.  The  result  is  the 
typical  litany  of  public  policy  ills,  “corruption,  inefficiency,  political 
capture, rent seeking, protectionism, inflated costs, and the development of 
cartels.”63  Interest groups are cast in a negative light, as rent seekers. Even 
without corruption, there is evidence to suggest that preference and other 
programs  that  limit  competition  in  procurement  are  inefficient,  poorly 
suited  to  the  policies  they  are  designed  to  implement,  fail  to  help  the 
constituencies they are ostensibly intended to help and can do more harm 
than good.64 A major concern in the bad story is that protectionism will be 
institutionalized  by  what  is  not  liberalized  in  the  GPA  market  access 
provisions.65 In the bad story, the GPA market access provisions have the 
potential to create a protected enclave of interest groups that make the GPA 
very difficult to change in a significant way, and thus procurement markets 
become very difficult to liberalize.
Which story is true? Perhaps the truth lies somewhere in between these 
two  stories.  Which  version  of  the  story  one  accepts  depends  on  one’s 
training and perspective. One can take a nonreductionist view and argue 
that elements of truth can be found in both stories. The good story accepts 
both  direct  and  collateral  policies  as  legitimately  pursued  in  public 
62 There is a substantial literature on the application of theories of justice beyond the domestic 
level. For a recent discussion, see generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, 
NATIONALITY AND SPECIES MEMBERSHIP (2006).  Some  of  the  influential  writings in  this  area  are 
CURRENT DEBATES IN GLOBAL JUSTICE (Gillian  Brock  &  Darrel  Moellendorf  eds., 2005);  ALLEN 
BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY AND SELF DETERMINATION: MORAL FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2004); GLOBAL JUSTICE AND TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS (Pablo DeGrieff & Ciaran P. Cronin eds., 2002); 
GLOBAL JUSTICE (Thomas  W.  Pogge  ed.,  2001);  CHARLES R.  BIETZ,  POLITICAL THEORY AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1999). Some of the literatures do not address the questions of institutions. 
To the extent it lacks institutional connections; it has a way to go in its direct application in legal  
contexts.
63 McCrudden & Gross, supra note 15, at 153-54.
64 See  generally Bernard  M.  Hoekman,  Using  International  Institutions  to  Improve  Public  
Procurement, 13 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 249 (1998); JOHN LINARELLI ET AL., SMALL AND MEDIUM 
SIZED ENTERPRISES AND EXPORT-LED GROWTH: ARE THERE ROLES FOR PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PROGRAMMES? 
(International Trade Centre UNCTAD/WTO 1999).
65 Linarelli, supra note 12, at 262-63.
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procurement.66 Direct policies have to do with buying goods, construction 
and services on the most efficient basis practicable. The focus is solely on 
value  for  money.  Collateral  policies  have  to  do  with  pursuing  social 
policies  outside  of  value  for  money,  realizing that  some social  policies 
come at a social cost, so long as a political consensus exists on such polices 
and their costs to society. Of course, what is one WTO  Member’s social 
justice is another’s protectionism. WTO  Members have no obligations to 
accept one another’s social justice policies.
IV. CONCLUSION
Merryman was right. We need to keep doing more inquiry about public 
procurement  law  and  policy.  More  inquiry  might  lead  to  greater 
understanding and appreciation of the importance of public procurement in 
both domestic and international legal contexts. As I have tried to explain 
above,  a  number  of  substantial  policy  issues  relate  to  the  operation  of 
public  procurement  at  both the  domestic  and international  levels.  These 
policy issues relate not only to good governance and to the efficiency of 
markets, but also to fairness and social justice in civil societies.
Based  on the  above account,  two areas  seem especially  fruitful  for 
further  study.  First,  as  for  domestic  law reform in countries  in  need of 
improving their procurement systems, it would seem that the focus should 
be  on capacity  development  and not  just  on  the  production of  law and 
regulation. The law on the books offers little by itself; it is the law in action 
–  the  competencies  of  procurement  officials  in  actually  conducting 
procurement – that matter most. I think that much of UNCITRAL’s focus 
on developing transparent principles relates to the need for competencies in 
basic  procurement  disciplines.  The  rules  enacted  are  designed  to  direct 
procurement  officials  toward  core  procurement  competencies.  Second, 
efforts to broaden participation in the GPA have the potential to expose the 
rock face of globalization. Without further inquiry, it is unknown at this 
time, but it would seem that at least as an area for further inquiry that the 
GPA market access negotiations, in the right cases, has the potential to tell 
us in stark relief how the domestic policy autonomy of smaller states is 
effected by international obligations. What we find out remains to be seen, 
but these are interesting times, as the GPA broadens its participation base.
66 For a discussion of these two kinds of policies, see generally ARROWSMITH, LINARELLI & WALLACE, 
supra note 19, at 237-322.
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